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author | Matthew Wild <mwild1@gmail.com> | 2023-01-13 14:29:08 +0000 |
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committer | Matthew Wild <mwild1@gmail.com> | 2023-01-13 14:29:08 +0000 |
commit | 341c8417c29d7ef3d47b8b940aad97e3bd073104 (patch) | |
tree | 094207138880f544475cbe652325ad919bc12540 /util-src | |
parent | 6264454dbe896339b61ae5d9531da635fca4ecc9 (diff) | |
download | prosody-341c8417c29d7ef3d47b8b940aad97e3bd073104.tar.gz prosody-341c8417c29d7ef3d47b8b940aad97e3bd073104.zip |
util.hashes: Add HKDF-HMAC-SHA256/HKDF-HMAC-SHA384
These are needed for PASETO v3.local.
Diffstat (limited to 'util-src')
-rw-r--r-- | util-src/hashes.c | 59 |
1 files changed, 59 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/util-src/hashes.c b/util-src/hashes.c index 5d67ca63..d949193c 100644 --- a/util-src/hashes.c +++ b/util-src/hashes.c @@ -28,9 +28,17 @@ typedef unsigned __int32 uint32_t; #include <openssl/md5.h> #include <openssl/hmac.h> #include <openssl/evp.h> +#include <openssl/kdf.h> #include <openssl/err.h> +/* Semi-arbitrary limit here. The actual theoretical limit +* is (255*(hash output octets)), but allocating 16KB on the +* stack when in practice we only ever request a few dozen +* bytes seems excessive. +*/ +#define MAX_HKDF_OUTPUT 256 + static const char *hex_tab = "0123456789abcdef"; static void toHex(const unsigned char *in, int length, unsigned char *out) { int i; @@ -214,6 +222,55 @@ static int Lpbkdf2_sha256(lua_State *L) { return Levp_pbkdf2(L, EVP_sha256(), SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH); } + +/* HKDF(length, input, salt, info) */ +static int Levp_hkdf(lua_State *L, const EVP_MD *evp) { + unsigned char out[MAX_HKDF_OUTPUT]; + + size_t input_len, salt_len, info_len; + size_t actual_out_len = luaL_checkinteger(L, 1); + const char *input = luaL_checklstring(L, 2, &input_len); + const unsigned char *salt = (unsigned char *)luaL_optlstring(L, 3, NULL, &salt_len); + const unsigned char *info = (unsigned char *)luaL_checklstring(L, 4, &info_len); + + if(actual_out_len > MAX_HKDF_OUTPUT) + return luaL_error(L, "desired output length %ul exceeds internal limit %ul", actual_out_len, MAX_HKDF_OUTPUT); + + EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_HKDF, NULL); + + if (EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx) <= 0) + return luaL_error(L, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); + + if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_hkdf_md(pctx, evp) <= 0) + return luaL_error(L, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); + + if(salt != NULL) { + if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_hkdf_salt(pctx, salt, salt_len) <= 0) + return luaL_error(L, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); + } + + if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_hkdf_key(pctx, input, input_len) <= 0) + return luaL_error(L, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); + + if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_hkdf_info(pctx, info, info_len) <= 0) + return luaL_error(L, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); + + if (EVP_PKEY_derive(pctx, out, &actual_out_len) <= 0) + return luaL_error(L, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); + + lua_pushlstring(L, (char *)out, actual_out_len); + + return 1; +} + +static int Lhkdf_sha256(lua_State *L) { + return Levp_hkdf(L, EVP_sha256()); +} + +static int Lhkdf_sha384(lua_State *L) { + return Levp_hkdf(L, EVP_sha384()); +} + static int Lhash_equals(lua_State *L) { size_t len1, len2; const char *s1 = luaL_checklstring(L, 1, &len1); @@ -250,6 +307,8 @@ static const luaL_Reg Reg[] = { { "scram_Hi_sha1", Lpbkdf2_sha1 }, /* COMPAT */ { "pbkdf2_hmac_sha1", Lpbkdf2_sha1 }, { "pbkdf2_hmac_sha256", Lpbkdf2_sha256 }, + { "hkdf_hmac_sha256", Lhkdf_sha256 }, + { "hkdf_hmac_sha384", Lhkdf_sha384 }, { "equals", Lhash_equals }, { NULL, NULL } }; |