| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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It's now possible to bind during SASL2 negotiation.
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Fixes a test failure on Lua 5.4 where ipairs("") does not produce an
error.
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In Lua 5.3 LUAL_BUFFERSIZE is a macro computed from sizeof and is thus
not known at pre-processing time, so this does not work.
Since Lua 5.1 is no longer supported, we can use luaL_prepbuffsize()
which is available from Lua 5.2
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Removes assumption that LUAL_BUFFERSIZE is known at pre-processing time,
which it is not in Lua 5.3 and 5.4, where it is a computed macro based
on sizeof.
Allocation of stack space is safer and faster, no need to worry about
luaL_prepbuffer failing to allocate memory and skipping free()
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The PASETO spec recommends - no, *requires* - that implementations enforce
type safety for keys, and e.g. do not pass them around as arbitrary byte
strings. Typed wrapper objects are recommended.
I originally followed this advice when starting the lib. However, key wrapping
and type safety is now also a feature of util.crypto. All we're doing is
duplicating it unnecessarily with this additional wrapper code.
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Unfortunately there are only a few relevant ones, but they did help catch some
bugs.
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Some changes/improvements in this commit:
- Default token lifetime is now 3600s (from 300s)
- Tokens are only validated once per upload
- "iat"/"exp" are handled automatically by util.jwt
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To avoid every user of the library needing to add and verify expiry info, this
is now handled by util.jwt itself (if not overridden or disabled).
Issuing tokens that are valid forever is bad practice and rarely desired, and
the default token lifetime is now 3600s (1 hour).
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Except 'none'. Not implementing that one.
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Now we can consistently apply the same tests to every algorithm, instead of
duplicating code.
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These are used by the RS*** and PS*** family of JOSE algorithms (e.g. in JWTs)
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In many cases code will be either signing or verifying. With asymmetric
algorithms it's clearer and more efficient to just state that once, instead of
passing keys (and possibly other parameters) with every sign/verify call.
This also allows earlier validation of the key used.
The previous (HS256-only) sign/verify methods continue to be exposed for
backwards-compatibility.
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PASETO provides an alternative to JWT with the promise of fewer implementation
pitfalls. The v4.public algorithm allows asymmetric cryptographically-verified
token issuance and validation.
In summary, such tokens can be issued by one party and securely verified by
any other party independently using the public key of the issuer. This has a
number of potential applications in a decentralized network and ecosystem such
as XMPP. For example, such tokens could be combined with XEP-0317 to allow
hats to be verified even in the context of a third-party MUC service.
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Specifically, ED25519 key generation/import/export, sign/verify operations,
and AES encrypt/decrypt.
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The macros in this header allow creation of GC-managed objects from manually-
managed C alloc/free APIs.
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...with opportunistic writes enabled.
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The condition checked for s2sin but not s2sout, so would have ignored
bidi-enabled s2sout sessions. Components as well.
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Some fiddling is required now in error_reply() to ensure the cursor is in the
same place as before this change (a lot of code apparently uses that feature).
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The old behaviour of falling back to the component domain when it is missing
has been merged into the logic for the existing "validate_from_addresses"
option (which is strict by default).
ejabberd already rejects component stanzas with no 'from' (as the XEP
requires), and this has led to compatibility issues for components that were
seemingly working fine with Prosody.
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See bd9e006a7a74
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No other changes to account for.
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This will allow us to return the success/failed as part of the SASL2 response,
and *then* perform the stanza sync as a second step.
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Fixes the same kind of issue as in 65563530375b but once and for all,
while improving similarity between incoming and outgoing connections.
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For luacheck, but it doesn't actually complain about this right now
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It used _G.print instead of the shell session print, which would
silently write to stdout
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By creating the account first without a password it can't be used until
the role has set. This is most important for restricted accounts, as a
failure to set the role would lead to the account having more privileges
than indented.
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