| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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Wrong part of Lua 5.1 compat removed in 0f4feaf9ca64
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Mostly to ensure it is available during tests, as util.startup is not
invoked there
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Code deduplication
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If the buffer is already empty, nothing to do. If we're throwing away the
whole buffer, we can just empty it and avoid read_chunk() (which in turn
may collapse()). These shortcuts are much more efficient.
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This lines don't appear to do anything useful, and all tests pass when they
are removed. Discovered via mutation testing.
I added extra tests to exercise this code, because I wasn't certain that there
were no side-effects caused by removal. Everything appears to be fine, thanks
to the "pending" check at the start of promise_settle().
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We don't expose the policies directly, to force people to go through :may().
However, there are times when we really just need to know what policies a
role has inside it (e.g. for reporting or debugging purposes).
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Previously, if the first inherited role had no opinion, it returned false and
prevented further consultation of other inherited roles.
This bug was found thanks to the implementation of missing test cases
identified through mutation testing.
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This fixes the signature parsing and building to work correctly. Sometimes
a signature was one or two bytes too short, and needed to be padded. OpenSSL
can do this for us.
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Fixes a test failure on Lua 5.4 where ipairs("") does not produce an
error.
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The PASETO spec recommends - no, *requires* - that implementations enforce
type safety for keys, and e.g. do not pass them around as arbitrary byte
strings. Typed wrapper objects are recommended.
I originally followed this advice when starting the lib. However, key wrapping
and type safety is now also a feature of util.crypto. All we're doing is
duplicating it unnecessarily with this additional wrapper code.
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To avoid every user of the library needing to add and verify expiry info, this
is now handled by util.jwt itself (if not overridden or disabled).
Issuing tokens that are valid forever is bad practice and rarely desired, and
the default token lifetime is now 3600s (1 hour).
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Except 'none'. Not implementing that one.
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In many cases code will be either signing or verifying. With asymmetric
algorithms it's clearer and more efficient to just state that once, instead of
passing keys (and possibly other parameters) with every sign/verify call.
This also allows earlier validation of the key used.
The previous (HS256-only) sign/verify methods continue to be exposed for
backwards-compatibility.
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PASETO provides an alternative to JWT with the promise of fewer implementation
pitfalls. The v4.public algorithm allows asymmetric cryptographically-verified
token issuance and validation.
In summary, such tokens can be issued by one party and securely verified by
any other party independently using the public key of the issuer. This has a
number of potential applications in a decentralized network and ecosystem such
as XMPP. For example, such tokens could be combined with XEP-0317 to allow
hats to be verified even in the context of a third-party MUC service.
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Some fiddling is required now in error_reply() to ensure the cursor is in the
same place as before this change (a lot of code apparently uses that feature).
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Sometimes you only care about a single attribute, but the child tag
itself may be optional, leading to needing `tag and tag.attr.foo` or
`stanza:find("tag@foo")`.
The `:find()` method is fairly complex, so avoiding it for this kind of
simpler use case is a win.
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No idea why the locals were declared on a line by itself. Perhaps line
length considerations? But saving 6 characters in width by adding a
whole line with 47 characters seems excessive.
This is still within the 150 character limit set by .luacheckrc
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Lua since 5.3 raises a fuss when time functions are handed a number with
a fractional part and the underlying C functions are all based on
integer seconds without support for more precision.
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XEP-0004: Partial forms are handled
XEP-0045: We're already strict with GC 1.0
XEP-0060: Change in semantics wrt 'pubsub#type', but not in code
XEP-0115: No protocol change
XEP-0138: Specification moved to Obsolete
XEP-0163: Editorial only change
XEP-0215: Minor schema change
XEP-0280: Editorial change
XEP-0297: Had the wrong version number
XEP-0106: Note missing piece for version 1.1
XEP-0313: Editorial change
XEP-0363: Editorial clarification, no code change required
XEP-0380: Registry additions, no code change needed
XEP-0384: Not directly supported, only here because people will ask otherwise
XEP-0445: Broken out of XEP-0401
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See https://www.ietf.org/blog/finalizing-ietf-tools-transition/
Already done in various other places.
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The last missing piece of #1760, otherwise SCRAM-SHA-*-PLUS is not
actually advertised.
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Added in d278a770eddc avoid having to deal with its absence in Lua 5.1.
No longer needed when Lua 5.1 support is dropped.
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Part of #1600
Is this module even needed anymore?
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Part of #1600
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