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authorMatthew Wild <mwild1@gmail.com>2023-01-13 14:29:08 +0000
committerMatthew Wild <mwild1@gmail.com>2023-01-13 14:29:08 +0000
commit341c8417c29d7ef3d47b8b940aad97e3bd073104 (patch)
tree094207138880f544475cbe652325ad919bc12540 /util-src
parent6264454dbe896339b61ae5d9531da635fca4ecc9 (diff)
downloadprosody-341c8417c29d7ef3d47b8b940aad97e3bd073104.tar.gz
prosody-341c8417c29d7ef3d47b8b940aad97e3bd073104.zip
util.hashes: Add HKDF-HMAC-SHA256/HKDF-HMAC-SHA384
These are needed for PASETO v3.local.
Diffstat (limited to 'util-src')
-rw-r--r--util-src/hashes.c59
1 files changed, 59 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/util-src/hashes.c b/util-src/hashes.c
index 5d67ca63..d949193c 100644
--- a/util-src/hashes.c
+++ b/util-src/hashes.c
@@ -28,9 +28,17 @@ typedef unsigned __int32 uint32_t;
#include <openssl/md5.h>
#include <openssl/hmac.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/kdf.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
+/* Semi-arbitrary limit here. The actual theoretical limit
+* is (255*(hash output octets)), but allocating 16KB on the
+* stack when in practice we only ever request a few dozen
+* bytes seems excessive.
+*/
+#define MAX_HKDF_OUTPUT 256
+
static const char *hex_tab = "0123456789abcdef";
static void toHex(const unsigned char *in, int length, unsigned char *out) {
int i;
@@ -214,6 +222,55 @@ static int Lpbkdf2_sha256(lua_State *L) {
return Levp_pbkdf2(L, EVP_sha256(), SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH);
}
+
+/* HKDF(length, input, salt, info) */
+static int Levp_hkdf(lua_State *L, const EVP_MD *evp) {
+ unsigned char out[MAX_HKDF_OUTPUT];
+
+ size_t input_len, salt_len, info_len;
+ size_t actual_out_len = luaL_checkinteger(L, 1);
+ const char *input = luaL_checklstring(L, 2, &input_len);
+ const unsigned char *salt = (unsigned char *)luaL_optlstring(L, 3, NULL, &salt_len);
+ const unsigned char *info = (unsigned char *)luaL_checklstring(L, 4, &info_len);
+
+ if(actual_out_len > MAX_HKDF_OUTPUT)
+ return luaL_error(L, "desired output length %ul exceeds internal limit %ul", actual_out_len, MAX_HKDF_OUTPUT);
+
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_HKDF, NULL);
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx) <= 0)
+ return luaL_error(L, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_hkdf_md(pctx, evp) <= 0)
+ return luaL_error(L, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
+
+ if(salt != NULL) {
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_hkdf_salt(pctx, salt, salt_len) <= 0)
+ return luaL_error(L, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
+ }
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_hkdf_key(pctx, input, input_len) <= 0)
+ return luaL_error(L, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_hkdf_info(pctx, info, info_len) <= 0)
+ return luaL_error(L, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_derive(pctx, out, &actual_out_len) <= 0)
+ return luaL_error(L, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
+
+ lua_pushlstring(L, (char *)out, actual_out_len);
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int Lhkdf_sha256(lua_State *L) {
+ return Levp_hkdf(L, EVP_sha256());
+}
+
+static int Lhkdf_sha384(lua_State *L) {
+ return Levp_hkdf(L, EVP_sha384());
+}
+
static int Lhash_equals(lua_State *L) {
size_t len1, len2;
const char *s1 = luaL_checklstring(L, 1, &len1);
@@ -250,6 +307,8 @@ static const luaL_Reg Reg[] = {
{ "scram_Hi_sha1", Lpbkdf2_sha1 }, /* COMPAT */
{ "pbkdf2_hmac_sha1", Lpbkdf2_sha1 },
{ "pbkdf2_hmac_sha256", Lpbkdf2_sha256 },
+ { "hkdf_hmac_sha256", Lhkdf_sha256 },
+ { "hkdf_hmac_sha384", Lhkdf_sha384 },
{ "equals", Lhash_equals },
{ NULL, NULL }
};